TIME: Almanac 1995

home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search

/ TIME: Almanac 1995 / TIME Almanac 1995.iso / time / 051490 / 0514992.000 < prev next >

Wrap

Text File | 1994-03-25 | 6.4 KB | 139 lines

<text id=90TT1279> <title> May 14, 1990: Oppenheimer vs. Teller:Who Was Right? </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1990 May 14, 1990 Sakharov Memoirs </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> SPECIAL BOOK EXCERPT, Page 56 Oppenheimer vs. Teller: Who Was Right? By Andrei Sakharov </hdr> <body> [From Memoirs. (c) 1990 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Translated by Richard Lourie] [Sakharov's work gave him unique insight into the controversy that raged after World War II between J. Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller over development of the U.S. hydrogen bomb.] About the time we were beginning our calculations, Robert Oppenheimer, chairman of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, was trying to apply the brakes to the U.S. hydrogen-bomb program in the expectation that the U.S.S.R. would then refrain from developing thermonuclear superweapons of its own. Oppenheimer's judgment was challenged by Edward Teller. Teller had experienced firsthand the 1919 communist revolution in his native Hungary, and he had a deep-seated mistrust for that kind of socialist system. He insisted that only American military strength could restrain the socialist camp from an expansion that would threaten civilization and democracy and might trigger a third world war. That is why Teller wanted to speed development of an American H-bomb and continue nuclear testing despite the genetic damage and other nonthreshold biological effects that implied. (Later on, I was to object to his position on testing.) He believed the stakes were too high to permit delay; this explains why he testified against Oppenheimer. Teller has been ostracized ever since by many American scientists who consider his testimony and his overall position to have violated ethical norms binding on the scientific community. What are we to make of the tragic conflict between these two extraordinary individuals, now that we can view it through the prism of time? Both men deserve respect. Each was certain that truth was on his side and that he was morally obligated to see the matter through--Oppenheimer by behaving in a way later construed as a breach of his official duties, Teller by disregarding the tradition of "good form" in the scientific community. Issues of principle were further complicated by technical and policy questions. Oppenheimer apparently believed bomb were not very promising. Teller believed that a practical solution would be found sooner or later; he was, of course, right. Facts that have come to light about the state of affairs in the late 1940s support Teller's point of view. Stalin, Beria and company already understood the potential of the new weapon, and nothing could have dissuaded them from going forward with its development. Any U.S. move toward abandoning or suspending work on a thermonuclear weapon would have been perceived either as a cunning, deceitful maneuver or as evidence of stupidity or weakness. In any case, the Soviet reaction would have been the same: to avoid a possible trap and to exploit the adversary's folly. Still, Oppenheimer's position was not without merit. He assumed it would be exceedingly difficult to build a hydrogen bomb, and he hoped an American moratorium would lead the U.S.S.R. to abandon further research. Oppenheimer surely realized that for his plan to work, Soviet H-bomb research had to be at a point where the U.S.S.R. would be ready to call it quits (this was probably not the case) and the U.S. had to be willing to accept some risk. Yet this was the period of maximum mutual distrust--the cold war, the Berlin blockade, soon the Korean War--and Moscow enjoyed superiority in conventional arms, just as it does now. Oppenheimer felt he had little hope of convincing his opponents that he was right, so he acted in a roundabout manner. He must have realized that seemingly safer policies were likely to prevail, and in that case he was prepared to quit the game. He had every moral right to do so, and this is indeed what happened. I cannot help feeling deeply for Oppenheimer. Striking parallels between his fate and mine arose in the 1960s, and later I was to go even further than he had. But in the 1940s and 1950s my position was much closer to Teller's, practically a mirror image (one had only to substitute "U.S.S.R." for "U.S.A.," "peace and national security" for "defense against the communist menace," etc.)--so in defending his actions, I am also defending mine at the time. Unlike Teller, I did not have to go against the current in those years, nor was I threatened with ostracism by my colleagues. How did these varied strands become intertwined in my life? If I am right in believing that the thermonuclear-weapon model on which Soviet scientists were working in the 1940s and early 1950s was the fruit of espionage, then Oppenheimer's case is strengthened, at least in theory. If the Americans had not initiated the whole chain of events, the U.S.S.R. would have pursued the development of a thermonuclear bomb only at a much later date, if at all. A similar scenario has been repeated with other weapons systems, including MIRVs [missiles carrying several warheads that can be independently targeted] and the Strategic Defense Initiative. Hindsight shows that the situation was already out of control by the time the Teller-Oppenheimer dispute erupted, and neither side could then have pulled back. We have been building thermonuclear weapons ever since; but so far, at least, we have avoided war. I would like to note that Teller's colleagues seem quite unfair (and rather mean spirited) in their condemnation: Teller was, after all, taking a stand based on principle. The very fact that he was willing to take a minority stance on an issue of such critical importance should be viewed as evidence in his favor. It is ironic that in 1945 Teller and Leo Szilard favored detonating an atom bomb at some uninhabited site in hope that a demonstration of its power might end the war without using the new weapon against a Japanese city. Oppenheimer persuaded them that the decision should be left to soldiers and politicians. </body> </article> </text>